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PART ONE 
Introduction 
Las Vegas has been internationally recognized as the entertainment capital of the world. 
Whether it is top dollar luxury, world class fine dining, or vibrant night life that one seeks, Las 
Vegas certainly has something for everyone. The latter half of the 20th century has shown the city 
unprecedented arenas of success, but with intense global competition on the rise, it is clear that 
Las Vegas is no longer the only major player in the game. The turn of the 21st century has 
brought a new wave of economic challenges, and though Las Vegas has adapted over the years 
with a remarkably consistent stream of reinvention, revenues have shifted not only to different 
subsets of the hospitality industry, but also abroad. The proliferation of the gaming industry 
worldwide has ushered in a new era of accessibility that will inevitably force Las Vegas’ 
experiential product to reposition. Now, patrons need not travel thousands of miles to the Mecca 
of gaming and entertainment when closer destinations offer similar experiences, and this presents 
a reasonable threat to the city’s potential revenue flow. Furthermore, domestic tourists are 
gambling less and less in favor of other forms of entertainment. The future of Las Vegas as an 
international resort destination is uncertain, but the city’s history may shed some light on current 
and prospective predicaments.  
Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to trace the history of the hospitality and tourism industry in 
the Las Vegas Metropolitan area, with respect to predominant management styles and revenue 
shifts, and discuss the industry’s economic outlook. 
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Statement of Objective 
This is an exploratory study that will detail the rise of the Las Vegas boom from a 
historical perspective and follow the transformation of this city from a gaming giant to a global 
tourism center. Over time, Las Vegas resort revenues have shifted, and whereas revenues have 
been predominantly generated by the gaming industry in the past, there are now several sources 
of revenue. The tourism industry has transformed Las Vegas from a band of high profile casinos 
to an international resort destination, and as a result, hotel rooms, entertainment, food and 
beverage, and meetings and conventions have all become significant revenue generators in their 
own rights. 
Justification 
It can be argued that “Las Vegas” is an experience and though not tangible, it is a 
product. Much of the Nevada’s commerce depends on the successful operation of the hospitality 
industry, and Las Vegas’ product life cycle can be a tremendous indicator of the city’s future 
course. Many people believe that Las Vegas has matured as a product and is fast approaching 
decline. If this is the case, it should be of the utmost importance to key decision makers of this 
industry and government officials that special attention is paid to the shifts and shrinkages of 
revenues. 
Constraints 
The research discussed in this paper is specific to the Las Vegas hospitality industry and 
therefore may not be generalizable to other international destinations.  One externally imposed 
constraint on this study is the reliability of the data. Most of the financial data gathered is self 
reported and unaudited, and the reliability of such information can be somewhat questionable. 
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Considering the importance of reliable information when analyzing trends, faulty information 
could paint Las Vegas’ outlook to be either bleaker or more desirable than it actually is. 
Glossary 
Pertinent terms will be found and defined in the context of the literature review. 
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PART TWO 
Introduction 
 To fully understand the current state of the city and project what realities it may face in 
the future, one must understand the history of Las Vegas from its humble mining beginnings in 
the early 20th century to the heavily boasted $10 billion City Center project. This literature 
review aims to provide broad insight into Las Vegas’ short centennial history for purposes of 
understanding managerial strategy shifts, and briefly discuss general hotel resort revenues in 5 
distinct categories: Gaming, Hotel Rooms, Entertainment, Meetings and Conventions, and Food 
and Beverage. There will be data on Las Vegas Strip hotel-casino properties as well as 
downtown Las Vegas hotel-casino properties to help support an open and inclusive 
representation of the Las Vegas tourism industry. 
Brief History of Las Vegas 
Beginnings  
Before Las Vegas rose to prominence as a notably reputable metropolis, it was a small 
town sustained by the San Pedro, Los Angeles, and Salt Lake Railroad. It was a repair shop of 
sorts for the railroads, and when they flourished, the town of Las Vegas did as well (Rothman, 
2002). In the early 1900s, the fate of the town, like the Nevadan Colony as a whole, was tied to 
the decisions and needs of the more populous states. Some states were closer in proximity, such 
as neighboring California, while others were farther, such as New York and Pennsylvania. 
However, it was clear that the town was inherently necessary in the sustenance of mining 
boomtowns such as Bullfrog and Rhyolite that sprang into productivity in 1910 (Moehring, 
2000). Settlers of the eastern states poured across the country in hopes of reaching the land of 
opportunity, and with the promise of mining riches, settlement towns began to take hold of the 
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western region. These surrounding mining settlements also allowed the town to source 
commerce in a less socially acceptable arena. The attention Las Vegas attracted was not always 
favorable as the city had been a symbol of two shunned but widely acknowledge vices, 
prostitution and eventually gambling. There was a lack of suitable entertainment options 
available for hard working male miners in these settlement towns, and it was there that the 
opportunity for women to supply leisurely activities surfaced (Hausebauk, Brents & Jackson, 
2009). Though prostitution would ultimately be outlawed in Clark County in favor of gaming, it 
is important to note that the root of sexual service in Nevada originated in the towns that grew 
around the mining industry. The dubious moral values that the city so defiantly maintained set 
the stage for the image that Las Vegas has so cleverly coined in the global marketing slogan 
“What happens in Vegas stays in Vegas.” 
Las Vegas soon began to show signs of an extraordinary trend. Between 1910 and 1920, 
Las Vegas’ population more than doubled, from 937 residents to 2,304 residents. The city has 
continued this trend, nearly doubling in population every decade since (Moehring and Green, 
2005). This was the beginning of the transformation from a railroad town to the twentieth 
century embodiment of tourism. In 1921, Union Pacific bought the San Pedro, Los Angeles, and 
Salt Lake Railroad and with that purchase, the company inherited the responsibility of Las 
Vegas’ infrastructure and social climate (Rothman, 2002). As a result of the transference of 
control, the town was subject to volatile shifts in the economy and the rise of unions. The 
national railroad strike of 1922 virtually signed the town’s death certificate and in a final blow to 
the economy, Union Pacific abruptly relocated the entirety of the railroad operation from Las 
Vegas to Caliente, California (Moehring, 2000). The western boom took a steep fall in the 1920s, 
and with mining settlements drying and the town’s central means of support departed, Las Vegas 
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was to either adopt or fade into inconsequence as so many other settlements had. Yet, the 
Prohibition was in full effect and in turn brought about the rise of an underground leisure 
economy.  
Unprecedented industrial growth encompassed the workforce countrywide, and the 
American worker began to search for an escape from the bustle of productivity (Hausebauk et 
al., 2009). Nevada had found its next silver mine, tourism. The concept of “escaping” was all too 
familiar in Nevada, so naturally the influx of vacationers looking to get away from the daily 
grind presented a much needed prospect. Fascination with the “wild west” and the lawless 
lifestyle that openly opposed the Prohibition gave Nevada the national platform to lure these 
tourists (Hausebauk et al., 2009). Another integral part played was that of the open-minded 
leadership assembled in Nevada. The state was now in need of people with experience running 
illegal operations (such as casinos and brothels), and these people were often misfits that were 
cast out of “decent” society. As cited by Bernhard, Green, and Lucas (2008), the gaming 
leadership “refused to conform to societal norms that governed more respectable business 
environments elsewhere.” In 1931, Nevada became the first state to legalize gambling, which 
continued to fuel the state’s ascent into the international spotlight. With a significantly more 
liberal approach to regulation, Nevada was now regarded as a state of outlaws that all but jumped 
at deviant opportunities to foster and perpetuate criminal activity, but interestingly, Nevada 
became an escape not only for outlaws, but in due time for the masses as well.  
Nevada grew even larger as federal interest began to increase. “From the huge 
reclamation projects of the 1920s, to the Hoover Dam— the single largest government project in 
the 1930s— to land grants for ranches, to the massive federal military spending in World War II, 
Nevada developed the infrastructure necessary to sustain larger populations,” as stated by 
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Hausebauk et al. (2009). This infrastructure helped to solidify Nevada’s foundation as a tourism 
based economy. Between 1930 and 1939, the federal government spent over $70 million dollars 
in southern Nevada, $19 million of that allocated to the construction of the Boulder Dam (now 
the Hoover Dam), and with one stroke of Washington’s proverbial pen, Las Vegas’ strategic 
importance was cemented. The funding also included a permanent military presence in the form 
of a $25 million air base built northeast of the city. The additional millions of New Deal dollars 
that were pledged by President Franklin D. Roosevelt furnished Las Vegas with an assortment of 
infrastructural improvements such as new roads and sewers (Moehring, 2000).In an effort to 
distance the Boulder Dam, now Hoover Dam, from “sinful activity”, the Secretary of the Interior, 
Dr. Ray Wilbur, built the town of Boulder City to support the thousands of workers from the 
Dam, and though the city was seen as a barrier between the Dam and Las Vegas, worries of 
competition ultimately were rendered unfounded, retrospectively (Rothman, 2002). With harsh 
restrictions on leisure activities, including the outlawing of prostitution and gambling, workers 
sought solace about 30 miles outside the city limits of Boulder City in the town of Las Vegas 
(Hausebauk et al., 2009). Even at the height of the Great Depression, which was otherwise a 
crippling force to the rest of the nation, Las Vegas thrived off the provided paychecks of nearly 
five thousand Dam workers during the four year project (Rothman, 2002). The city was well on 
its way, and the projected path of tourism that would elevate the city was slowly starting to take 
definition. Following World War II in the 1940s, extravagant resorts came into existence in Las 
Vegas offering the vacationer a luxurious oasis of gambling, alcohol and headlining 
entertainment. As a result of this emergence, tourism became the largest employer in southern 
Nevada (City of Las Vegas, n.d.).  
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The Era of Organized Crime 
The start of this era actually lay with Nevada’s legalization of gambling in 1931. Though 
the mob would not maintain a significant presence until the 1940s, much of the leadership that 
first operationalized Las Vegas as a tourism hotspot was of a somewhat similar nature. For 
example, the man responsible for the widespread title of “the Las Vegas Strip” was Guy McAffe, 
a former Los Angeles vice cop who was barred and cast out of Los Angeles for running illegal 
casino operations there (Smith, 2005). J. Kell Houssels, another outlaw from Southern California 
and a seldom mentioned Las Vegas pioneer, would also soon relocate to a place that was more 
than tolerant of his chosen occupation. McAffe and Houssels would eventually partner in 
running the Golden Nugget hotel-casino, and before Houssels death in 1979, he would own the 
El Cortez hotel-casino in downtown Las Vegas, the Tropicana hotel-casino on the Strip, and the 
Showboat off the Strip (Bernhard et al., 2008). Even outside of Las Vegas’ lucrative hospitality 
industry, Houssels’ influence on the city was quite substantial including ownership stakes in a 
bus line, a taxi company, and a downtown restaurant, as well as involvement in local politics (J. 
KellHoussels Jr., interview by Michael S. Green, May 7, 2005, Las Vegas, Nevada). Other 
notable figures include Tony Cornero, who opened the Meadows casino, and Marion Hicks, who 
built the El Cortez hotel-casino, but perhaps one of the most celebrated figures whose legacy 
continues to permeate the Las Vegas community is Sam Boyd. Bernhard et al. (2008) describe 
Boyd’s strides in the business community as first of their kind by a gaming executive, and to this 
day Boyd Gaming is amongst the top 6 Las Vegas operations (the other 5 being Las Vegas 
Sands, Wynn Resorts, MGM International, Caesar’s Entertainment, and Station Casinos). 
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Arguably the most distinguished era in Las Vegas history was that of the mob. With the 
Great Depression subdued, the government cracking down on organized crime all over the 
country, and the casino gambling industry showing tremendous growth potential in Las Vegas, 
the city became a safe haven of sorts for mob activity. Las Vegas was already amidst 
transformation from small supply town to full blown resort destination, and the contribution of 
the mob was instrumental to the success of the city’s new image (Hausebauk et al., 2009). 
Leadership that was sent to establish a presence in Las Vegas was usually deployed by mob 
families in large Midwest cities such as Chicago, Detroit, and Kansas City (Bernhard et al., 
2008). Mob interest was generally believed to be started with the infamous crime figures Meyer 
Lansky and Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel, Luciano family made men that hailed from New York 
City (Griffin, 2006). Siegel was sent to develop west coast operations for the underground 
organization. Highway 91, also known as the Los Angeles Highway, Las Vegas Boulevard, and 
eventually the Strip, was blossoming with casino properties, and though the Mob initially just ran 
wire operations, the organization watched eagerly as the desert birthed an oasis.  
In 1941, the El Rancho Vegas opened its doors as the first casino property outside of 
downtown on the Strip (Moehring, 2000). Closely thereafter, the Last Frontier opened in 1942, 
both properties paving the way for the casino resort that would redefine luxury and place Las 
Vegas amongst the affluent circles of the world. After opening before completion and closing in 
1946, the glamorous Flamingo Hotel was officially opened in 1947. According to Moehring 
(2000), “the Flamingo was a turning point because it combined the sophisticated ambience of a 
Monte Carlo casino with the exotic luxury of a Miami Beach-Caribbean resort.” Though the El 
Rancho Vegas and the Last Frontier were both considered upper-class casino establishments, the 
Flamingo Hotel was the first to break away from the “wild west” theme that was prevalent in Las 
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Vegas. Originally estimated to be a $1 million dollar project, the construction of the Flamingo 
soon ballooned to nearly $6 million dollars because of costly mistakes, unnecessarily extravagant 
materials, and imported furnishing (McCracken, 1997). While Siegel was confident that the 
Flamingo would be the gold mine that he had envisioned, his careless dealings with the mob and 
their concerns about a reasonable return on investment ultimately cost Siegel his life. His delight 
of the Flamingo’s success was short lived as he was murdered in June of 1947 just as the resort 
began to gained traction (McCracken, 1997). 
Though many leaders would follow in Siegel’s path, the succeeding leaders had an 
entirely different approach to management. The mob was dancing the fine line between 
legitimate and illegitimate operation, and while violence was a powerful weapon, prudence 
would prove to be just as powerful. Asserted by Bernhard et al., (2008), “other operators in this 
era frowned on Siegel’s visibility and open thuggery, realizing that his behavior was hardly 
helpful to their objectives of achieving respectability and larger-scale profitability.” 
Coincidentally, this stance would give the Las Vegas community a sense of safekeeping, as the 
mob was not looking to attract negative attention. These velvet glove men, men that understood 
the reality of mob business but were not violent themselves, recognized the importance of 
discretion and its relationship to successful operations (Cahill, 1977). They would include Morris 
Moe Dalitz and Wilbur Clark,, operators of the Desert Inn, Gus Greenbaum, operator of the 
Flamingo and the Riviera, Benny Binion, operator of the Horseshoe, Tony Cornero, financer of 
the Stardust, and Anthony Tony the Ant Spilotro and Frank Lefty Rosenthal, later operators of 
the Stardust.  
It is widely believe that mob money was behind the purchase and maintenance of several 
Strip properties during this time including the Sahara and the Sands, both opening in 1952, the 
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Riviera and the Dunes, both opening in 1955, the Hacienda, opening in 1956, the Tropicana, 
opening in 1957, and the Stardust, opening in 1958 (Denton & Morris, 2001). Because of 
skimming operations, “cash that was removed from casino count rooms before it was ever 
counted” (Griffin, 2006), it is difficult to measure just how profitable these casinos. These loads 
of cash were taken from the casinos on a regular basis and delivered to the mob families in the 
mid-west and on the east coast. With the addition of burglary and fencing (selling stolen goods) 
operations, the mob was established as Las Vegas’ invisible but present guiding hand, a reality 
that would continue to blur the lines between the good guys and the bad guys (Griffin, 2006).  
Another interesting byproduct of the Mob Era was the introduction of a delicate dance 
between the law and organized crime. As droves of money from questionable sources continued 
to pour into the state, the federal government started to gradually narrow its focus on Nevada, 
thus further heightening Nevada’s rebellious image and also moving state officials to take 
considerable action. The tactic had a significant impact and made officials “paranoid and eager 
to rid themselves of any image of vice that might be detrimental to that of a resort destination” 
(Hausebauk et al., 2009). As gambling had now become the centerpiece of operations in Nevada, 
the establishment of the Gaming Control Board in 1955 would help to regulate and legitimize the 
exploding industry. Earlier in this paper, prostitution was briefly discussed as having been 
crucial to the development of the city. Prostitution was tied to Las Vegas in the city’s infancy, 
but the trade eventually became an integrated piece of the casino gaming industry as well. 
Because open prostitution was seen as a vice that would detract from the boasted resort image, 
the resort towns and their casino operations distanced themselves from prostitution in urban 
areas and started to relegate it to rural areas (Hausebauk et al., 2009). However, in 1980 Nevada 
Supreme Court gave control and licensing of brothels to local counties with a population of less 
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than 400,000 people. Though there was tremendous opposition from the gaming industry, an 
industry that wanted to control prostitution on its own terms, and the newly flourishing 
convention industry, an industry that was fearful of the tainted image Las Vegas was subject to if 
prostitution was legalized, the support from rural communities was unwavering as brothels were 
unquestionably a major source of revenue for rural areas (Hausebauk et al., 2009). 
The mob and the Nevada government had been on what most would have considered 
friendly terms, each unofficially supporting and protecting the interests of the other on certain 
levels (Denton & Morris, 2001). According to the American Gaming Association (2009), the 
1950s brought federal suspicion of Las Vegas casino operations, and the Senate Committee to 
Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, lead by Senator Estes Kefauver, began 
federal proceedings with hopes of evidencing significant criminal influence in the casino 
industry. The government believed that several owners of the casinos were but front men 
working for the mob, and though many relevant figures were subpoenaed and questioned, the 
government received little cooperation (Griffin, 2006). Nonetheless, Mob-run Vegas continued 
to pull ahead in the hay days of the 1960s and 1970s.  
Under the management of Frank Lefty Rosenthal, the Stardust became the premier casino 
in the still ever burgeoning town. Ownership of properties changed frequently during this time 
period as the Strip started what proved to be an unending cycle of reinvention. Las Vegas was 
shifting into a new phase of operation, the corporate era, and who better to usher in that era than 
the likes of Howard Hughes?  Arriving at the Desert Inn in 1966 and deciding to simply purchase 
the property rather than vacate, Hughes went on to buy the Frontier, the Sands, Castaways, the 
Landmark, and the Silver Slipper, and at the height of his ownership, Hughes controlled nearly 
one third of the gaming revenue on the Strip (Rothman, 2002). As each of those properties was 
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believed to be backed by mob funding, this marks the first legitimate opposition to the mob’s 
stronghold (though it was surely not directly intentional), and when the government finally 
decided to intervene, the city found itself in the thick of yet another transformation.  
Rise of the Corporation 
By the late 1970s, it was clear that the grand days of mob controlled Vegas were fast 
fleeting as the Nevada State government made exceptional progress in ridding the state of mob 
ownership. The deviant and sinful practice of “gambling” was taking new form as the legally and 
social more acceptable leisure activity of “gaming,” and the state began to constrict regulation. 
There were two pivotal events that indicated the commencement of a new time. First was the 
1979 ruling of the Gaming Control Board that permanently revoked Rosenthal’s gaming license. 
The Stardust was considered to be the pinnacle of mob ownership in Las Vegas at that point, and 
by revoking Rosenthal’s license and forbidding him to operate in gaming in Nevada, the state 
completely overhauled the management at the Stardust (Jaschke & Otsch, 2003). The second was 
the stance the state took about gaming operators. As the proliferation of gaming spread in the 
forms of state lotteries and the legalization of gaming in Atlantic City, the industry that once 
solely relied on people with less than desirable pasts to operate was no longer stigmatized. 
Nevada legislatures were now liberated from having to allow devious backgrounds to control and 
operate the state’s main source of commerce (Rothman, 2002). The year of 1979 proved to be the 
revolutionary year that yielded strong federal muscle, and when Gaming Control agents shut 
down the Aladdin’s casino after three years of ongoing investigation, there was no doubt that 
federal presence was there to stay (Jaschke & Otsch, 2003). 
The toppling of the mob’s empire in Las Vegas drew much attention in the 1980s. The 
decade brought a vigorous round of prosecutions, hordes of corporate capital, and a new vision 
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for the newly mob-eradicated city. With the law’s implicit blessing of the industry, gaming 
operations were now being consolidated into large corporations. The dominating gaming 
companies of the 1980s were Harrah’s, the MGM, Del Webb, the Hilton, and Caesar’s World, all 
of which were publicly traded companies (Jaschke & Otsch, 2003). While the city acclimated to 
the new reign of legitimate business, another prominent figure whose influence was as much a 
contribution to the Las Vegas of the 21st century as Howard Hughes was Steve Wynn. Though 
Wynn had investments in Atlantic City and Las Vegas (the Golden Nugget) during the 1980s, 
arguably his defining contribution was the Mirage. In 1989, the over 3,000 room megaresort was 
opened (LVCVA, 2012). The resort was a spectacle the likes of which the world had not seen, 
complete with a white tiger habitat, a dolphin tank, and a magnificently erupting volcano that 
spewed at the top of every hour.  
The Mirage went on to lead a massive development of Las Vegas Boulevard over the 
next decade and by the close of the century, Las Vegas’ skyline and culture had been entirely 
altered (Jaschke & Otsch, 2003). From 1993 to 1998, the city stood watch as corporate 
developers imploded four historic hotels, the Dunes, the Sands, the Landmark, and the Aladdin, 
to make room for new properties. The decade saw the opening of several megaresorts including 
the following: the Excalibur in 1990 (with 4,000 rooms), the Luxor, Treasure Island, and the 
MGM Grand Hotel and Theme Park (with 2,500, 2,900, and 5,000 rooms, respectively) in 1993, 
the Stratosphere Tower and the Monte Carlo (the latter with 3,000 rooms) in 1996, the New York 
New York (with 2,000 rooms) in 1997, the highly anticipated Bellagio (with 3,000 rooms), and 
Mandalay Bay, The Venetian, and the Paris (with 3,700, 4,000, and 3,000 rooms, respectively) in 
1999 (LVCVA, 2012). 
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Las Vegas boomed at the turn of the century with some 36 million visitors per year 
(Jaschke & Otsch, 2003), and development plans continued to abound. The country was brought 
to an abrupt halt in the events of September 11, 2001, and even the bright lights of Las Vegas 
were not able to escape the looming cloud of the first economic recession of the decade. 
Overnight, national security constricted travel, and business in the Las Vegas tourism industry 
was nearly halved. The effect of the attacks on Las Vegas was best described by Brean (2011) in 
the statement, “It emptied our skies and our hotel rooms….Even in a city built on implosions, we 
are haunted by the sight of buildings falling down.” The city struggled to recuperate from the 
unforeseen blow with most of the major hotels laying off employees. A year later, however, the 
swirl of devastation had subsided, and by 2004, corporate M&A was rampant. Mass 
conglomerates were in the making as MGM Grand and the Mirage merged to acquire several 
properties, and Harrah’s merged with Caesar’s World to become Caesar’s Entertainment 
(Jaschke & Otsch, 2003).  
The city was alive with the promise of new projects, chief among them, Steve Wynn’s $2 
billion Le Reve (later opening as Wynn Las Vegas). The lavish property would eventually open 
in 2005 with 3,000 rooms, once again leading the mass of new developments that dominate 
today’s Strip. The city was back to business as usual; Revenues were exceptional in 2006 and 
2007, and the world was buzzing around the announcement of the City Center project, the first 
$10 billion complex and soon to be largest private development in United States history. After 
recovering relatively quickly from the last slight recession, no one could have imagined that the 
worst economic downturn since the Great Depression was right around the corner. Corporations 
continued to build and open such properties as the Palazzo and Encore (with 3,000 and 2,000 
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rooms, respectively) in 2008 (LVCVA, 2012), but that year would mark the first year of 
declining revenues.  
As the subprime lending crisis mounted wings and the financial system collapsed on 
itself, the city’s source of revenue was quickly drying. Few cities and states were impacted as 
heavily as Las Vegas and Nevada. In addition to the failing housing market, the state is greatly 
reliant on the hospitality industry as the primary source of commerce. However, a tourism based 
economy survives on the discretionary income of the market, and with consumers reeling in their 
wallets, Las Vegas headed straight for financially distress. In an analysis published by the Center 
for Gaming Research, Schwartz (2011) reported that the sharpest decline for Nevada’s gaming 
industry was seen from late 2008 to early 2009. With the highest foreclosure and unemployment 
numbers in the country, Nevada has struggled in recent years to stay afloat, and the projects that 
were supposed to pull Las Vegas back to the peak of the late 1990s have been met with 
lackluster reception. Multi-billion dollar projects such as Fontainebleau and Echelon were halted 
due to capital deficiencies and liquidity concerns, and even the prolific City Center project, long 
touted to symbolize the resilience of the city, nearly went bankrupt before opening in the fourth 
quarter of 2009 (Schulz, 2009).  
The Cosmopolitan opened at the close of 2010, and though the property seems to be 
doing rather well considering the circumstances, Deutsche Bank is still struggling to recoup the 
nearly $4 billion dollar investment (Schulz, 2009). Though the city that was thought to be 
impenetrable has been significantly wounded, revenues have slowly started to increase since 
2010. The “Big 6” gaming operators continue to control the majority of Las Vegas Strip hotel-
casino properties, those operators being Wynn Resorts, MGM Resorts International, Caesars 
Entertainment, Las Vegas Sands Corporation, Boyd Gaming, and Station Casinos (Bernhard et 
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al., 2008). As the city wades further into the 21st century, these corporations will aim to address 
many unanswered questions. The next few years of action could determine whether the city is 
restored to its former glory or fall from the ranks as quickly as it rose. 
Las Vegas Resort Revenues 
Casino Gaming  
 Tourism is the dominant driver of Nevada’s economy. Under this umbrella, gaming is the 
largest revenue generating industry in the state, and one of the largest revenue generators of the 
entertainment sector in the United States. For purposes of analyzing Las Vegas’ economic 
landscape in particular, statistics referenced in this section will specifically regard casino 
gaming. The University of Nevada, Las Vegas Center for Gaming Research defines a casino as a 
non-restricted gaming licensee with annual revenues of at least $1 million (Schwarz, 2012). The 
Nevada Gaming Control Board tracks licenses, tables, games, and slots in their quarterly report, 
also providing definitions to each of the terms. Licenses now includes restricted slots only, non-
restricted slots only, slot operators, non-restricted slots and games, manufacturers, distributors, 
and slot route operators. Games include craps, roulette, blackjack, baccarat, bingo, keno, race 
book, sports book, and other casino games. Tables include poker, pan, gin, and other non-house-
edge games. Finally, slots includes all slot machines and mobile gaming devices (2012). As of 
2011, Nevada has 2,885 operating licenses, 5,901 games, 957 tables, and 187,372 slots with 
about 80% coming from Las Vegas gaming operations (Nevada Gaming Control Board, 2012). 
As an aside, though lotteries have been seen to compose a significant portion of overall gaming 
revenues, the state of Nevada does not have a lottery, and thus lottery statistics are inapplicable. 
In terms of sourcing the Las Vegas gaming industry, there are several large gaming suppliers 
including Shuffle Master, Inc., International Game Technology (IGT), Bally Technologies, 
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Aristocrat Technologies, and Konami Gaming, most of which have international headquarters in 
Las Vegas (Vegas, Inc., 2012). 
From a global perspective, the gaming industry is on the incline and has been consistently 
over the years, and according to Global Betting and Gaming Consultants (2012), global 
gambling revenues passed $400 billion in 2011. However, the adverse effects of the recession on 
Las Vegas hospitality as a whole paint more of a bleak picture through a local lens. Gaming 
revenue spiked in Clark County in 2007 and took a steep dive until 2010. The last two years of 
data suggests a slow but gradual uptick in revenues. While downtown Las Vegas boasts 16 non-
restricted casino gaming operations and the Strip boasts 22 non-restricted casino gaming 
operations, the industry has only recently started to show signs of improvement from the 
crippling economic downturn (Schwartz & Liao, 2012). Clark County gaming revenues for 2011 
were $9.2 billion, an increase of 3.5% overall from 2010 revenues. The Strip contributed $6.1 
billion to that figure, increasing 5.1% from 2010 revenues, and downtown Las Vegas contributed 
$497 million, increasing.07% from 2010 revenues (LVCVA, 2011). In 2011, the Strip gaming 
operations accounted for 37.92% of total revenues and downtown Las Vegas gaming operations 
accounted for 55.11% of total revenues (Schwartz, 2012).Gaming revenues continue to yield the 
largest contribution to overall revenues, and Las Vegas has set the bar relatively high for the rest 
of the globe with many of the most profitable casinos in the world. It should come as no surprise 
then that the casino gaming industry is also a large source of employment in Nevada. According 
to the Schwartz & Liao (2012), in 2011, casino departments of the Strip properties employed 
nearly 24,000 people, and casino departments of downtown Las Vegas properties employed 
nearly 3,000 people.  
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Hotel Rooms  
 Las Vegas is known for having hotels with a larger than average number of rooms. Most 
hotels in other cities have somewhere around 300 rooms, but in Las Vegas, that would not only 
be considered a boutique hotel, but a hotel on the smaller end of the spectrum. The Las Vegas 
Conventions and Visitor’s Authority, or LVCVA, reports that the city has over 150,000 hotel 
rooms (2011). Collectively, the Strip has nearly 90,000 of those rooms across the 22 properties 
averaging about 4,000 rooms per property (Schwartz & Liao, 2012). With this information, it is 
easy to understand just how far Las Vegas is out of the typical scope of worldwide hotel 
operations; of the 25 largest hotels in the world, based on number of rooms, there are 23 Las 
Vegas properties (Vegas Today and Tomorrow, 2012). Revenues for the room departments are 
not quite at the levels of the casino departments, but nonetheless they are still significant to the 
city’s broader hospitality industry.  
Like gaming revenues, room revenues too spiked in 2007 before depressing annually for 
three years, but in 2011, room revenues for the Strip were $3.5 billion with an increase of 12.9% 
from 2010 revenues, and room revenues for downtown Las Vegas were $140.6 million with an 
increase of 3.7% from 2010 revenues (Schwartz & Liao, 2012). The 2011 average daily rate 
(ADR) for the Strip hotel properties is $130.58 and for downtown Las Vegas hotel properties the 
ADR is $51.91 (Nevada Gaming Control Board, 2012). Occupancy is another key metric in 
presenting a complete picture of the rooms department. According to the LVCVA, the average 
hotel occupancy across Las Vegas in 2011 was 86.9% (2012), and the Nevada Gaming Control 
Board reports an average of 91.12% occupancy for Strip hotel properties and 83.13% for 
downtown Las Vegas hotel properties. Though occupancy seems to have slipped over the last 
few years, it is still well above the national average occupancy of 60.1% (LVCVA, 2012). In 
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2011, the Strip hotel room departments accounted for 24.27% of total revenues and downtown 
Las Vegas hotel room departments accounted for 15.62% of total revenues (Schwartz, 2012).  
 With the average visitor’s stay at 3.7 nights for 2011 (LVCVA, 2012), this department is 
largely dependent on the efficiency and reliability of its employees. The hotel room departments 
of the Strip properties employ about 20,000 people and the hotel room departments of downtown 
Las Vegas properties employ about 1,600 people (Nevada Gaming Control Board, 2012). 
However, an interesting noteworthy trend has emerged from this category of revenue over the 
past two decades. In their reporting, Schwartz & Liao have asserted that revenue from room 
departments have grown faster than any other hospitality category for the Strip properties 
increasing by 431.14% since 1990 (2012). The noteworthy mention is the disproportional 
parallel of employment costs. Apparently, the rates at which revenues are growing are not 
matching the rates at which employment costs are growing. Room rates have been steadily 
increasing since the 1990s, and naturally, we would have expected to see a subsequent increase 
of a similar pace in employment costs, but it seems that employment costs have only quadrupled 
while revenue growth has quintupled (Schwartz & Liao, 2012). This trend suggests an increase 
in productivity of the room departments as the average number of rooms per employee has risen 
from 3.32 in 1990 to 4.37 in 2011. In a time when labor and corporate relations are frequently on 
the verge of upset, this could be a point of concern in the future for hotel management.  
Food and Beverage 
The food and beverage department is one of the few departments that visitors can rarely 
bypass. Chances are relatively high that visitors will spend money on food or beverages at some 
point during their visit, and though the food and beverage department was originally meant to 
compliment and generally support the influx of gamblers back in the day, the department is now 
21 
 
a stand alone, significant revenue center. According to the 2011 Las Vegas Visitor Profile, 
99.8% of respondents reported food and beverage expenditures, and the average expenditure 
during a single trip in this category was approximately $275.27 (LVCVA, 2011). Together, the 
combined revenues of food and beverage departments contribute just about as much revenue as 
hotel rooms. Historically the food and beverage department has maintained about a 20% portion 
of total resort revenues since the mid 1980s, but as hotel room revenues increased over the past 
30 years, revenues from the beverage department have slightly decreased and revenues from the 
food department have slightly increased. In 2011, food and beverage revenues were $3.29 billion 
for the Las Vegas Strip, an increase of 12.4% from 2010 revenues; for downtown Las Vegas, 
food and beverage revenues were $204 million, only a slight increase of .4% from 2010 revenues 
(Schwarz, 2012). The food and beverage department is also one of the most human capital 
intensive departments, if not the most intensive, employing nearly 36,000 people at the Strip 
properties and nearly 3,000 people at downtown Las Vegas properties (Schwarz & Liao, 2012). 
It is important to distinguish the food and beverage department from the restaurant 
industry. Food and beverage encompasses all venues that serve food and beverages, but fine 
dining restaurants are a unique subset that generally have different characteristics and target a 
different demographic than the larger umbrella. Just as Las Vegas touts some of the most famous 
hotels and attractions in the world, the restaurant industry also includes some of the most famous 
world class dining establishments. According to LasVegasRestaurants.com, there are 147 
restaurants on the Las Vegas Strip (2012). Las Vegas holds 4 spots on Gayot’s 2012 top 40 
restaurants in the U.S., and those restaurants include Joel Robuchon (MGM Grand), Picasso 
(Bellagio), Restaurant Guy Savoy (Caesars Palace), and Twist by Pierre Gagnaire (Mandarin 
Oriental) (2012). Many of those restaurants are stand alone operations that are not associated 
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with any hotel casino property, but nonetheless, they most likely have to maintain some measure 
of profitability to have space on some of the most expensive real estate in the world. It is also 
important to mention that many of the restaurants that are hosted by the hotel-casino properties 
are not actually owned by the hotel. For example, N9NE Steakhouse at Palms Casino Resort, 
STK Steakhouse at the Cosmopolitan, and Tao Asian Bistro at the Venetian are all operated by 
outside parties, N9NE Group, One Group, and Tao Group respectively. The hotel-casino 
operations collect a very small portion of the revenues, the rest of which are retained by the third 
party. Las Vegas has certainly attained a decent slice of an industry that is projected to total $632 
billion in 2012, according to the National Restaurant Association (2012). 
Entertainment 
 Las Vegas has a broad scope of entertainment options including nightlife, shows, 
exhibits, museums, theme parks, and pool parties. For purposes of discussing revenue trends, this 
portion of the review will focus on nightclubs, live shows, and pool operations. While in the past 
Las Vegas was able to thrive by catering almost exclusively to gamblers, the city soon realized 
the potential profitability of offering numerous amenities to extend past gaming. Las Vegas’ 
close ties to Hollywood celebrities back in the 1950s built the foundation of which the city’s 
image as “the entertainment capital of the world” stands. The A-list entertainers that gambled, 
dined, performed, and even married in this city paved the way for headliners that call Las Vegas 
home today. 
 Most of the hotels had lounges, showrooms, and bars to entertain guests, but it was not 
until 1995 that Club Rio, the first large scale nightclub, was built (Stein, 2011). As far as most 
casino operators were concerned, the primary form of entertainment was gambling and as a 
result, the concept of the nightclub was seen as an unwelcome distraction. There was also much 
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risk associated with hosting a nightclub for hotel administration, and outcomes such as attracting 
the wrong type of crowds, increasing liability because of fights and physical confrontations, and 
imposition on regular guests were all considered too uncertain to justify. However, after the 
successful openings of several off Strip clubs, hotel operators began to reconsider their stances 
on nightclub operations, and suddenly, Las Vegas exploded into the international nightclub 
industry. With the openings of mega night clubs such as RA at the Luxor, Studio 54 at MGM 
Grand, Rum Jungle at Mandalay Bay, and C2K at the Venetian between from 1997 to 1999, Las 
Vegas’ began to attract a whole new demographic (Stein, 2011).  
The city continued expansion of the nightclub industry through the 2000s, and according 
to a report by  the trade publication Nightclub & Bar, Las Vegas nightclubs hold 22 stops on the 
list of top 100 nightclubs in the country (based on revenues) (2012). The top night club in the 
country, Cosmopolitan’s Marquee nightclub, brought in revenues of over $70 million in 2011 
which was also the club’s first full year of operation (Nightclub & Bar, 2012). Las Vegas also 
holds the next three positions on the list, with XS at Encore and Tao at the Venetian both 
reaching revenues of over $60 million, and Pure at Caesars Palace reaching over $45 million 
(Nightclub & Bar, 2012). The nightclub industry has been regarded as one of the few bright spots 
during the recession as the industry grew by as much as 20% annually from 2007 to 2011 (Gelt, 
2011). The results from LVCVA’s 2011 Visitor’s Profile Study support this information 
reporting that 46% of survey respondents indicated that they had visited a hotel club, bar, or 
lounge during their visit (2012). 
 The Las Vegas Strip is saturated with various forms of entertainment, but the live shows 
dominate outdoor advertising along and around the Strip. With an excess of options, visitors can 
see anything from comedy shows to magic shows to exotic shows to international headliners. 
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According to LVCVA’s 2011 Visitor’s Profile, 60% of visitors surveyed indicated that they 
attended some sort of live show during their visit, down from 68% in 2010, and the most popular 
category of live shows attended was lounge shows (2012). There are many residencies including 
Elton John, Celine Dion, and Shania Twain at Caesar’s Palace, David Copperfield at MGM 
Grand, Donny and Marie at the Flamingo Hilton, and the Jabbawockeez at the Monte Carlo.  
Perhaps the best known headlining shows in Las Vegas, however, are the Cirque Du 
Soleil shows. The company currently has seven productions on the Strip, Mystere, “O”, 
Zumanity, Ka, Love, Criss Angel Believe, and Zarkana according to the company’s official 
website (Cirquedusoleil.com, 2012). Resident Cirque Du Soleil shows play to over 9,000 people 
a night just in Las Vegas alone, which is about 5% of Las Vegas’ nightly population (Gould, 
2012). Revenues across all productions are forecasted to exceed $1 billion dollars this year with 
ticket prices soaring as high as $253 a piece (Carone, 2012). The average ticket price for Las 
Vegas shows as a whole increased from 2010 to 2011 to $76.46, and of the nearly 95 shows in 
Las Vegas, 29 of the shows have consistently sustained price increases (Yancey, 2011). Amongst 
the visitors that attended some type of live entertainment in Las Vegas, the average number of 
shows seen in 2011 was 1.1 headlining shows, 1.2 production/Broadway shows, 1.7 lounge acts, 
1.1 comedy revues, and 1 impersonator/tribute show, and 1.1 magic shows (LVCVA, 2012). 
 Live shows and nightclubs reign Las Vegas nights, and for a while daylight hours were 
somewhat untapped and ignored. As Las Vegas has shifted its image to appeal to a broader 
demographic that now includes younger patrons, focus has had to shift as well. The casino floor 
is no longer “the only game in town,” and with a large portion of visitors completely bypassing 
gaming operations (nearly 23% of all visitors over the age of 21 in 2011, in fact), other areas of 
hotel properties were quickly primed to start generating revenue (Schwarz, 2012). In the past, 
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pool season has consisted of a few seasonal employees idly monitoring guests lest a grown man 
would try to drown in the hotel’s four foot deep swimming pool. However, it would only be a 
matter of time before “nightlife” would be translated into “daylife” next to those very same 
pools. In 2004, the Hard Rock Hotel mirrored the activities of the night world with the opening 
of its pool party, Rehab. For the first time, a Las Vegas hotel was offering all guests, even 
outside of the hotel, the opportunity to continue the party after the nightclubs closed.  
Fast-forward to 2012, and Las Vegas hotels now host over a dozen pool parties. Several 
properties closely followed suit thereafter Rehab including MGM Grand with the opening of Wet 
Republic, the Mirage with the opening of Bare, the Venetian with the opening of Tao Beach, the 
Palms with the opening of Ditch Friday, Wynn with the opening of Encore Beach Club, and the 
Cosmopolitan with the opening of Marquee Day Club (Finnegan, 2011). According to Joe 
Magliarditi, former president of the Hard Rock Hotel, the pool has now been fully incorporated 
into the hotel product, and the revenue stream is solid. “The conservative number, revenue wise, 
is that a pool can generate $1 million per week, and that mostly happens over the course of a 
weekend,” says Magliarditi (Kaplan, 2010). That figure may be a bit hard to believe when 
considering an amenity that has long been regarded as a past time for the wives of high rollers, 
but with admission fees ranging anywhere from $20 to over $100 per person, bottles of alcohol 
going for several hundreds of dollars apiece, and cabana and daybed reservations costing 
multiple thousands of dollars, it becomes less difficult to grasp the immense revenue potential of 
these pool operations (Finnegan, 2011).  
Meeting and Convention  
The city’s initial interest in the meetings and conventions industry started in the 1950s. 
Because new hotel-casino properties were opening nearly every year of that decade, the city 
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became interested in attracting large business groups to help supplement occupancy during 
traditionally slower periods of the week (McCracken, 1997).The city opened the Las Vegas 
Convention Center specifically for conventions in1959 (LVCVA, 2012), which was also the 
same year the state legislation created the Nevada Gaming Commission. As cited by Fenich & 
Hashimoto (2004), the meetings and convention segment was originally deemed irrelevant by 
gaming operators in the past because of the narrow focus on gaming patrons. After all, the profile 
of a serious gambler and the profile of a businessman or a businesswoman have only the slightest 
of likeness, one primarily concerned with premier entertainment, cheap food, nocturnal gambling 
sprees, and comp accommodations and the other with business meetings, reasonable yet classy 
dining options, and conservative spending. In the changed tune of 1990s, the casino industry 
started to embrace this long neglected bunch, eventually to be referred to as the MICE sector 
(Meetings, Incentive, Conventions, and Exhibitions), by building facilities and accommodations 
to attract them (Fenich & Hashimoto, 2004). Thus meetings and conventions soon outgrew the 
Las Vegas Convention Center though it preceded all of the modern day convention centers of the 
hotel-casino world, and the sector has since become an important source of revenue for the Las 
Vegas hospitality industry. 
With nearly 5 million of the 40 million annual visitors being convention delegates and 
over 19,000 conventions landing in Las Vegas (LVCVA, 2012), attracting and retaining 
convention business is crucial in maintaining a competitive edge in this hyper-competitive 
market. Resorts are not only competing with each other; they are competing with the city. 
Beyond even the state level, resorts are also competing with other popular convention cities such 
as Orlando and San Francisco, but Las Vegas has continued to top the list of cities with the top 
number of trade shows. According to the Trade Show News Network, Las Vegas hosted 55 of 
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the largest shows in the country which is more than the closest two competitors combined 
(2012). The city currently has more than 10.5 million square feet of convention and meeting 
center space composed primarily of the Las Vegas Convention Center (with 2.3 million square 
feet of space), the Mandalay Bay Events Center (with 1.7 million square feet of space, and the 
Sands Expo and Convention Center (with 2.25 million square feet of space) (Las Vegas Online, 
2012). Even during the economic downturn, the meetings and conventions segment is on the rise 
and has contributed $4 billion in non-gaming revenues (Las Vegas Online, 2012).  
Gradual Shift in Revenues 
 Make no mistake, the gaming industry is still in domination of the Las Vegas tourism 
industry and continues to generate the largest revenues of any of the other tourism related 
industries. However, the last 30 years have brought a significant shrinkage to gaming revenues 
not only as a result of trying economic environments, but as a proportional percentage of all Las 
Vegas departmental revenues. Ryan asserts that the trend of Las Vegas Strip properties that make 
more money from restaurant, entertainment and rooms than from table games and slots is 
moving upward (2012). In addition, Schwartz (2012) reports that “Gaming win, as a percentage 
of total revenue, has declined over the past 25 years, chiefly because of the emergence of 
lodging, dining, and nightlife components of casino resorts as revenue centers.” The report goes 
on to show that gaming revenues for the Las Vegas Strip were 58.63% of total revenues in 1984, 
but that percentage has gradually decreased to 37.92% of total revenues in 2011 (Schwartz, 
2012). Even generating roughly 38% of total revenues though, the gaming divisions still 
outperform all other departments by at least 13%, the closest being the rooms department 
(Schwartz, 2012). 
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 With the exception of the beverage department, a department that has not deviated too 
greatly from 1984 levels of revenues, every other category of revenue for the Las Vegas Strip 
has seen substantial growth. The food department has increased from 11.41% of total revenues in 
1984 to 15.47% of total revenues (Schwartz, 2012).  The “Other” category, which consists of 
entertainment, meetings and conventions, etc…, has exploded more than doubling its 1984 
percentage of total revenues of 6.14% to a staggering 15.13% of total revenues in 2011 
(Schwartz, 2012). This dramatic increase can most likely be attributed to booming meetings and 
conventions business since the century’s opening and the growth of entertainment options with 
the introduction of the nightclub, dayclub, and pool party scenes. Finally, the hotel rooms 
category has increased from 16.10% of total revenues in 1984 to 24.27% of total revenues in 
2011 (Schwartz, 2012). These shifts in Las Vegas revenues support the general idea that the Las 
Vegas tourism industry is shifting away from gaming. 
Macau’s Gaming Revenues 
Long gone are the days when Las Vegas could afford to solely depend on gaming 
revenues to sustain its exponential growth. Not only have other international cities stepped into 
the gaming spotlight, but Las Vegas’ target market has expanded as well. The gaming industry is 
highly competitive, and several other international gaming destinations (Macau, Singapore, 
etc…) are grabbing considerable portions of the pie. Macau in particular presents the greatest 
threat to Las Vegas gaming, but presumable from the proportion of international visitors to Las 
Vegas, the threat is international rather than domestic in nature. As cited by the LVCVA, 
international tourists composed a modest 16% of all tourists in 2011 (2011), and this percentage 
could be greatly impacted by the growing desirability of Macau. 
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 It has been over a decade since control of the Portuguese colony was returned to China, 
and almost immediately, Macau’s gaming revenues skyrocketed eventually surpassing Las 
Vegas revenues in 2006 to become the world’s new gambling center (Barboza, 2006). Gaming 
revenues have grown percentage wise by double digits each year including a 13% growth in the 
first 11 months of 2012 (Stutz, 2012). In 2011, Macau reported an astonishing $33.5 billion in 
gaming revenue, a figure that is over five times the revenues of Las Vegas Strip casino properties 
(Stutz, 2012); as stated previously, the collective of Las Vegas Strip properties reported $6.1 
billion in gaming revenues (LVCVA, 2011). It seems that the global gaming industry as a whole 
is shifting, but while the Las Vegas tourism industry should be aware of this movement, it should 
aim to hold the attention of the 84% of Las Vegas tourists that are domestic. 
Conclusion 
Las Vegas has progressed leaps and bounds during its short 107 year existence, but not 
without setbacks. The town’s growth was stinted after the mining boom and with the expulsion 
of the railroad in the 1920s, the town faced complete obliteration. The small settlement was left 
with a trivial population, extremely limited resources, and a looming question of direction, but 
when the city turned to tourism, it became clear that Las Vegas was headed for stardom. It is the 
pioneering spirit of reinvention that carried Las Vegas through the desperate times and into 
prosperous times. Criminal organizations, largely responsible for supplying the illegitimate funds 
that paved the foundations of Las Vegas tourism, flocked to the city at the height of federal 
scrutiny. Though the mob’s contribution to the realization of the city’s alluring image is 
indisputable, the city was soon removed from unlawful practices and transformed into a 
corporate investment hub. Even before the government “cleaned up” the city’s hotel-casino 
operations, corporations began to buy and restructure properties.  
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As the industry began to focus on the broader tourism market outside of gaming 
operations, revenues in other crucial divisions such as hotel rooms, food and beverage, and 
entertainment rose; Eventually, those revenues would helped to support the city in periods of 
slowed gaming revenues. At the turn of the century, Las Vegas was considered one of the 
premier international destinations in the world, and the Las Vegas Strip was in its prime as a 
beacon of opulence and ubiquitous recognition. Even through the few economic downturns of 
the past decade, the city has continued to expand and contract as necessary, but with such an 
uncertain position, the future of tourism in Las Vegas has been the subject of much debate in 
recent years. The next section of this paper will present a case study of the Houston oil industry, 
an industry with interest parallels to the Las Vegas tourism and hospitality industries. The 
discussion will include a brief background of the Houston industry, the challenges that the city 
faced following global shifts, actions that were taken to compensate for the shifts, and similar 
recommendations for Las Vegas based on those actions. Other relevant recommendations will 
conclude the paper. 
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PART THREE 
Introduction 
 Though there may be different schools of thought as to what is and will be happening in 
the Las Vegas tourism industry, one widely agreed upon conclusion is that the industry is in fact 
changing. As discussed in the literature review, revenues are gradually shifting away from 
gaming, and as the centerpiece of the Las Vegas tourism industry slowly shrinks, the city will be 
faced with the challenge of reinvention yet again in the coming years. However, much can be 
learned from observation of other industry examples. The following case study provides the basis 
of which the primary recommendation of this paper is built upon. Other recommendations 
include identification of new revenue sources that cater to the next generation, expansion of the 
focus on current revenue bright spots (nightlife, entertainment, etc…), and continual application 
of reinvention.  
Case Study: The Houston Oil Industry 
One of the foremost industries that Houston, Texas has a close knit history with is the oil 
industry. When oil was discovered 90 miles east of the city in 1901 and in several other areas 
around the city from about 1905 to 1919, Houston was alive with the potential to become a major 
oil and gas production center (Feagin, 1985). There were several distinct advantages that Texas 
oil fields took advantage of during this time period, three of which greatly contributed to the 
city’s domination of the national oil markets. Firstly, Houston benefitted from the development 
of a solid infrastructure that regional competitors did not have; past agricultural commerce 
provided the city with the banking and railroad infrastructure needed to facilitate the operation of 
the oil industry (Feagin, 1985). Secondly, the city’s location away from the Gulf coast line made 
it ideal for oil production. Many competitors were facing extraneous circumstances that were out 
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of the company’s control such as floods and hurricanes (Feagin, 1985). Thirdly, the synergistic 
integration of another pivotal industry in the industrial city of Detroit expanded the use of crude 
oil and thus positioned Houston at the helm of a revolutionary turning point in United States 
history. Prior to the first decade of the 1900s, crude oil was used for kerosene, fuel oil, and 
lubricants (Feagin, 1985). However, it was Henry Ford’s perfection of mass automobile 
production starting in 1908 that shifted the course of Houston’s oil industry and tied the two 
complimentary industries together. 
The automobile industry exploded in the 1910s. According to the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census (1961), 1.8 million automobiles were registered in the U.S. in 1914, but that number had 
increased to 18 million by 1924. Furthermore, there was an increase in fuel usage from 2.7 
billion gallons in 1919 to 15.7 million gallons in 1930. During this period, the oil industry 
accounted for over half of the city’s jobs (Feagin, 1985). The industry continued to grow into the 
1960s when large reserves of oil were discovered in the Middle East. The companies controlling 
the Texas oil fields began to shift focus to international operations, a decision which left Houston 
in a difficult predicament. The one industry town watched as its main economic engine relocated 
to international subsidiaries (Bernhard & Ahlgren 2011). However, the intellectual capital and 
the wherewithal to successfully operate the oil industry lay in the office headquarters that 
continued to reside in Houston. “By the 1960s and 1970s Houston had evolved into the oil-
technology distribution center for the world's oil industries,” according to Feagin (1985). 
Houston’s permanent ties to the U.S. and world oil industries proved to be costly; the expansion 
and contraction of the city’s economy mirrored the activity of the global oil industry (Feagin, 
1985). This resulted in severe economic slumps when oil pricing was depressed in the 1980s and 
is an excellent example of what can happen to a city built around a core industry. Even a city 
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prospered by the coat tailing of the world can experience desperation. Best said by Feagin 
(1985), “this suggests how critical any shift in the economic context can be for urban 
development-and how quickly the fortunes of a city tied to the capitalistic world-market system 
can change.” 
According to Bernhard & Ahlgren, there were several actions made in Houston that are 
applicable to cities such as Las Vegas, many of which are not directly linked to the primary 
industry of oil (2011). Per their 2011 report, they assert that the city refocused with the following 
actions: 
• Houston companies sought out new business opportunities internationally and outside of 
the oil industry 
• Houston used its expert oil capabilities in manufacturing, operational, engineering and 
financial knowledge to become a global exporter of intellectual capital 
• Houston attracted other industries such as the alternative energy industry (wind and solar 
power firms) 
• Downtown Houston launched four major sports teams in brand new arenas 
• Houstonians embraced and adapted to the globalization 
• Houston became a global command center for international energy industry 
• City leaders and officials invested in and promoted civic and cultural programs to 
improve the quality of life for Houston residents 
This case study on the development and transformation of the Houston Oil industry echoes the 
familiar case of the Las Vegas tourism industry. Based on these actions, Bernhard & Ahlgren 
recommend the following actions to be taken in Las Vegas: 
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• Las Vegas should develop local talent by investing in educational and developmental 
programs that will equip leaders with the tools to handle the complexity of the tourism 
industry’s future 
• Las Vegas should expand upon the existing technology base that has already been 
established with gaming source manufacturers that are interested in creating a strong 
presence in the online gambling community 
• Las Vegas should boost airport connectivity to both Asia, where the gaming industry is 
flourishing, and Latin America, where gaming activity is likely to increase in the future 
• Las Vegas should look to attract a higher level of talent in the commercial gaming 
industry by investing in local arts, cultural, and diversity programs 
There is a large emphasis on the development of educational programs and local talent in 
these recommendations, and while Houston may have jumped at the opportunity to tap their 
system’s educational potential, Nevada has not historically been as welcoming of education in 
the tourism industry. Because of the high turnover rates of the hospitality industry in Las Vegas, 
a large supply of interchangeable human capital is required, and that workforce mostly does not 
meet the national standards of education. With imported experts such as Gary Loveman of the 
Harvard Business School, and Steve Wynn of the University of Pennsylvania, the industry seems 
to shun local development of talent in favor of East coast wisdom. This will most likely be the 
greatest point of resistance in the consideration of the aforementioned recommendations.  
Conclusion 
 The laws of gravity imply that the rise and fall of every empire is inevitable, but 
ultimately, timing is what allows for reinvention. As the king of reinvention, Las Vegas has thus 
far done a remarkable job transitioning through management changes, economic success and 
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challenge, generational succession, and social evolution. In the wake of what has now been ruled 
a global financial crisis, the city built on the discretionary income of the masses is struggling to 
hold onto the rope of former glory. Studying the situational parallels of other industries that have 
experienced detrimental threats, such as those of the Houston oil industry case study, can help 
our hospitality leaders make informed decisions about forward movement. There is at least one 
certainty; a clear and confident outlook on the future requires thorough analysis of the past and a 
firm understanding of the present. An introspective recap of what has worked in prior times is 
not just ideal, but necessary for the CEOs of present day Vegas if the industry is to sidestep 
similar mistakes and the possibility of an untimely conclusion. 
Recommendations 
In conjunction with the previous section, the primary recommendation of this paper is for 
the casino gaming industry to firmly reposition itself in the global gaming market. “The 
entertainment capital of the world” continues to be the city’s fitting tag. However, the 
proliferation of gambling across the world has made it quite difficult for Las Vegas to hold onto 
the title of “the king of gaming” because of the variety of gambling experiences that can be had 
not only outside of the city limits, but outside of the United States. Macau, Singapore, and the 
Bahamas have all attracted substantial international attention in the gambling community, the 
first of which has been named the new gambling center of the world (Barboza, 2007). With the 
addition of internet gambling, the city’s grip on that title becomes even less pronounced. As 
stated in the previous section, Las Vegas’ strength in the casino gaming industry is the intellect 
behind gaming technologies. There are several gaming technology companies that already have 
established headquarters in Las Vegas off of Sunset Road including Konami Gaming, Bally 
Technologies, International Gaming Technologies (IGT), and Shuffle Master. These companies 
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have the benefit of international reach, a corporate tax friendly environment in Nevada, and an 
established customer base of high profile corporations such as MGM Resorts and Caesars 
Entertainment. Similar to Houston’s response to drying oil reserves, Las Vegas should seek to 
capitalize on casino gaming intellectual capital. Houston changed its dwindling primary industry 
to become one of the premier exporters of oil industry knowledge. Regardless of the future of 
Las Vegas gaming revenues, it would be in the city’s best interest to fortify the casino gaming 
industry. 
Expanding on the first recommendation and as discussed near the conclusion of the case 
study, the city should begin to invest in and uphold the educational system in Las Vegas. The 
local university, the University of Nevada Las Vegas, is full of intellectual resources and 
knowledge from the International Gaming Institute to the Center for Gaming Research, all of 
which are housed by a world renowned, top 5 hotel program. Gaming and hotel minds such as 
those of Dr. Bo Bernhard of Harvard University and Dr. Karl Mayer of University of 
Wisconsin/Harvard University speak to the caliber of professionalism projected onto the 
University’s student population. The Las Vegas education system is bursting with the potential to 
produce and mold exceptional local talent that can lead Las Vegas’ tourism industry into the 
future. However, as mentioned earlier, this would most likely be a point of friction with current 
corporate ideology and approaches to managerial acquisition. 
The second recommendation is to identify new sources of revenue that cater to the next 
generation. The classic Las Vegas visitor was ready to gamble at some point when they entered 
the city, but the new generation is less concerned with gaming than entertainment. Generation Y 
largely seems to define fun and Las Vegas in different terms than the preceding generations. Las 
Vegas is an experiential product, and the next generation will want entertainment during every 
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aspect of their experience, a wide range of variety at that. Though there are several of these 
experiences that are not generated “in house,” such as the Electic Daisy Carnival (EDC) that 
comes to Las Vegas every year, these experiences can be created in a new capacity by corporate 
conglomerates the operate the Las Vegas tourism industry. Along with the recommendation to 
find new sources of revenue comes the recommendation to expand on the new sources that have 
been brought to the forefront of the Las Vegas scene over the last decade. The industry has 
already begun to move on this generation with the nightclub, dayclub and pool party operations. 
The market now has an overabundance of options for patrons to choose from, but as mentioned 
earlier, these operations have grown tremendously, and even amidst the recession they have been 
one of the few areas of progress. An in-depth analysis of generation Y and its preferences in 
relation to tourism experiences (hotel, entertainment, etc…) should be a point of future 
exploration.  
The final recommendation is to continue to cling to the model of reinvention. When 
assessing Las Vegas’ list of core competencies, the ability to constantly reinvent the experiential 
product is atop the list. Though the model was originally applied in an effort to avert the town’s 
demise, the model coincidentally blazed the trail for what would become a quintessential Las 
Vegas characteristic. Reinvention has pulled Las Vegas through Everest highs and discouraging 
lows all the while keenly differentiating each transition period. Now almost a naturally cyclical 
process, a decadal transition is not only necessary, but unabashedly expected of this city. Patrons 
take note of worn furniture, outdated property design, and stagnant entertainment venues, and as 
time goes on, remodeling cycles will likely shorten. It is important that key decision makers do 
not forsake the fantastical element of escapism. The world often turns to Las Vegas with 
38 
 
curiosity of new things to come, and as long as the city continues to reinvent itself, it will not fail 
in that delivery. 
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